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By no means comprehensive, but here are eight points to understand the current crisis in Bangladesh and why it appears particularly intractable. At its heart, this current conflict is about the legitimacy of the current government.
This plan, which had it been implemented would in all likelihood have avoided the current situation and could well have been a boon to the Awami League, was rejected. There was no further talk of interim elections, and rather that any dialogue with the BNP, there was a suppression of the party's basic political rights.
With an election lacking legitimacy, and Political crisis in bangladesh government seeking to prevent the BNP from organizing as a party, it was perhaps inevitable that the BNP, which can count on at least 30 to 35 percent of the vote, would at some point snap.
Why did the government barricade Zia and cancel the public meeting? Why did the government do this? It was perhaps feared that Khaleda Zia might, for example, have called on those who attended the meeting to refuse to leave until the government agreed to elections or some other demand.
The very different political protests i n Shahbag in February following the Quader Molla tribunal decision and of Hefazet on 5 May were in their own ways examples of what the government wanted to avoid. Therefore, whilst the government would have known that the barricading of Zia and the cancelling of the public meeting in Dhaka would garner criticism which it didit was a better option than having to deal with the risk an uncontrollable situation in Dhaka.
Another reason could be that the Awami League thought that the barricading of Khaleda Zia, and the prohibition of a public meeting, worked inand so the party leaders thought t hat they should repeat the same game plan.
Nothing has weakened the BNP more that the violence. On the 5th and 6th January, the first four reported deaths were all BNP activists - two at the hands of the police, and two by Awami League activists.
Then the opposition picket violence, involving the throwing of firebombs at vehicles started, and the current tally as of 24 January is 19 members of the public killed by picket violence, 8 opposition activists killed by the police and 4 more opposition activists killed apparently by pro-government activists see full figures here.
Nothing has weakened the BNP more than these burnings.
However, over the course of the following two weeks, a lot of this must have been lost. And many people, not just the AL supporters, will have agreed.
From being a political party with legitimate political demands that had the support of many in Bangladesh, the government was able to portray the BNP as a party apparently authorizing or turning a green light to terrorist violence. It also provides a pretext to arrest her.
And apart from its effect amongst Bangladeshis, the BNP has one would imagine rather disgraced itself with the international community.
This was a lesson that the BNP should have learnt from the picket violence at the end of where similarly it lost political support, and the government was also at that time able to portray the party, quite rightly, as apparently countenancing terrorist violence. Of course the BNP and its supporters have denied the party's involvement in the violence - but if this was really so, then where was the BNP's clear instructions to its activists not to get involved in such bombings that put people's lives at risk?
And where was the outrage and clear and unequivocal condemnations of the violence when these incidents happened? And, if it was not their own activists doing it, where was the recognition that that bombings was hurting the party politically? It is true that there is no hard evidence that opposition pickets - or those instructed by them - were involved - though the i njuries to the recent 'bomb-maker', a BNP student activist, is highly suggestive.
But opposition picket violence is not as damaging to the BNP as one would expect. One might expect that BNP's alleged complicity in violence would severely weaken the party.
Whilst no doubt it has impacted upon those in the middle ground of politics, there are reasons why many observers think that it does not do them any long term harm.Jan 25, · From being a political party with legitimate political demands that had the support of many in Bangladesh, the government was able to portray the BNP as a party apparently authorizing or turning a green light to terrorist violence.
Jan 07, · Sham election deepens Bangladesh political crisis By K. Ratnayake 7 January The Bangladesh election held on Sunday was a political farce marked by a very low voter turnout and unprecedented. Sep 25, · So economically Bangladesh is at huge crisis and the future is still uncertain whether it will be possible to deport all the Rohingyas or not.
The crisis has become one of the biggest political challenges for the government which could be solved long ago if the government could draw proper international diplomatic attention to this ethnic crisis.
Bangladesh’s economy has grown by approximately 6 percent annually for two decades despite prolonged political instability, poor infrastructure, endemic corruption, insufficient power supplies. Sep 05, · Aid agencies have warned of a growing humanitarian crisis in overstretched border camps, where water, food rations and medical supplies are running out of stock.
With daily violence at the pre-election level, the political crisis is fast approaching the point of no return and could gravely destabilise Bangladesh unless the sides move urgently to reduce tensions.